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ABSTRACT 
 
Privacy-preservation for sensitive data has become a challenging issue in cloud computing. Threat 
modeling as a part of requirements engineering in secure software development provides a structured 
approach for identifying attacks and proposing countermeasures against the exploitation of vulnerabilities 
in a system. This paper describes an extension of Cloud Privacy Threat Modeling (CPTM) methodology for 
privacy threat modeling in relation to processing sensitive data in cloud computing environments. It 
describes the modeling methodology that involved applying Method Engineering to specify characteristics 
of a cloud privacy threat modeling methodology, different steps in the proposed methodology and 
corresponding products. In addition, a case study has been implemented as a proof of concept to 
demonstrate the usability of the proposed methodology. We believe that the extended methodology 
facilitates the application of a privacy-preserving cloud software development approach from requirements 
engineering to design. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many organizations that handle sensitive information are considering using cloud computing as it 
provides easily scalable resources and significant economic benefits in the form of reduced 
operational costs. However, it can be complicated to correctly identify the relevant privacy 
requirements for processing sensitive data in cloud computing environments due to the range of 
privacy legislation and regulations that exist. Some examples of such legislation are the EU Data 
Protection Directive (DPD) [1] and the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) [2], both of which demand privacy-preservation for handling personally identifiable 
information. Further than that, there is no consensus within International law whether specific 
requirements should be applicable to genetic information. There are several documents at the 
regional and international level that include some guidelines, for example UNESCO International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003) and the OECD Guidelines on Human Biobanks and 
Genetic Research Databases (2009). The Council of Europe has enacted an Additional Protocol to 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health 
Purposes (2008), which is legally binding to the states that has ratified it. 
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Also national law might contain specific regulation entailing further conditions and criteria for 
the handling to be legal and thereby legitimate. In Sweden for example, the Act on Genetic 
Integrity1 lays down specific requirements when performing genetic testing or taking part of the 
genetic information. These type of requirements also exist in other Member States. 
 
Threat modeling is an important part of the process of developing secure software – it provides a 
structured approach that can be used to identify attacks and to propose countermeasures to 
prevent vulnerabilities in a system from being exploited [3]. However, the issues of privacy and 
security are really two distinct topics [4] as security is a core privacy concept, and the current 
focus of the existing threat modeling methodologies is not on privacy in cloud computing, which 
makes it difficult to apply these methodologies to developing privacy-preserving software in the 
context of cloud computing environments. 
 
In 2013, the Cloud Privacy Threat Modeling (CPTM) [6] methodology was proposed as a new 
threat modeling methodology for cloud computing. The CPTM approach was originally designed 
to support only the EU DPD, for reducing the complexity of privacy threat modeling. 
Additionally, there were weaknesses in threat identification step through architectural designs in 
the early stages of Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) that demanded improvements.  
This paper describes an extension of the CPTM methodology according to the principles of 
Method Engineering (ME) [5]. The method that has been applied is one known as “Extension-
based”, which is used for enhancing the process of identifying privacy threats by applying meta-
models/patterns and predefined requirements. This new methodology that is being proposed 
provides strong methodological support for privacy legislation and regulation in cloud computing 
environments. We describe the high-level requirements for an ideal privacy threat modeling 
methodology in cloud computing, and construct an extension of CPTM by applying the 
requirements that were identified. In addition, we provide a case study [6] containing 8 key 
privacy requirements and 26 threats according to the DPD.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background to these 
developments by outlining the CPTM methodology and existing related work. Section 3 describes 
the characteristics that are desirable in privacy threat modeling for cloud computing 
environments. Section 4 describes the steps and products for the proposed new methodology.  
Section 5 describe a case study and implements the proposed design. Section 6 presents the 
conclusions from this research and directions for future research. 
 
 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
The CPTM [6] methodology was proposed as a specific privacy-preservation threat modeling 
methodology for cloud computing environments that process sensitive data within the EU’s 
jurisdiction. The key differences between the CPTM methodology and other existing threat 
modeling methodologies are that CPTM provides a lightweight methodology as it encompasses 
definitions of the relevant DPD [1] requirements, and in addition that it incorporates classification 
of important privacy threats, and provides countermeasures for any threats that are identified. In 
[22] the authors implemented the CPTM as a proof of concept for a data-intensive genomics 
cloud platform [21] and identified the weaknesses to be refined in this paper.  
 
For the first step in the CPTM approach, the DPD terminology is used to identify the main 
entities to cloud environments that are in the process of being developed. Secondly, the CPTM 
methodology describes the privacy requirements that must be implemented in the environment, 
e.g., lawfulness, informed consent, purpose binding, data minimization, data accuracy, 
                                                    
1
 Lag (2006:351) om genetisk integritet m.m. 
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transparency, data security, and accountability. Finally, the CPTM approach provides 
countermeasures for the identified threats. Detailed description of the CPTM methodology steps 
have been discussed in [6] (Sections 3, 4 and 5). 
 
While the CPTM methodology was the first initiative for privacy threat modeling for cloud 
computing environments in accordance with the EU’s DPD, it nevertheless does not support other 
privacy legislation, such as that required under the HIPAA [2]. In this paper, we identify the 
CPTM methodology weaknesses in supporting different privacy legislation and threat 
identification process and refine the methodology by applying an Extension-based ME approach. 
There has been a significant amount of research in the area of threat modeling for various 
information systems with the goal of identifying a set of generic security threats [7], [8], and [9]. 
There are guidelines for reducing the security risks associated with cloud services, but none of 
these include an outline of privacy threat modeling. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) 
guidelines [10] are not thorough enough to be referred as a privacy threat model because they are 
not specific to privacy-preservation. In [19, 20] authors discuss the security and privacy issues of 
processing sensitive big data in cloud computing environments, including loss of control, multi-
tenancy, and lack of trust, in addition to survey privacy-preservation data processing approaches. 
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) has identified a broad range 
of both security risks and benefits associated with cloud computing, including the protection of 
sensitive data [11]. Pearson [4] describes the key privacy challenges in cloud computing that arise 
from a lack of user control, a lack of training and expertise, unauthorized secondary usage, 
complexity of regulatory compliance, trans-border data flow restrictions, and litigation. 
 
LINDDUN [12] is an approach to privacy modeling that is short for “likability, identifiability, 
non-repudiation, detectability, information disclosure, content unawareness, and non-
compliance”. This approach proposes a comprehensive generic methodology for the elicitation of 
privacy requirement through mapping initial data flow diagrams of application scenarios to the 
corresponding threats. The Commission on Information Technology and Liberties (CNIL) has 
proposed a methodology for privacy risk management [13] that may be used by information 
systems that must comply with the DPD. 
 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF A PRIVACY THREAT MODELING METHODOLOGY 
FOR CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
This section describes the features that we believe a privacy threat model should have in order to 
be used for developing privacy-preserving software in clouds in an efficient manner. Based on the 
properties that are identified, we then apply the Extension-based methodology design approach to 
construct an extension of the CPTM for supporting various privacy legislation in Section 4.  
 
3.1. Privacy Legislation Support 
 
Methodological support for the regulatory frameworks that define privacy requirements for 
processing personal or sensitive data is a key concern. Privacy legislation and regulations can 
become complicated for cloud customers and software engineering teams, particularly because of 
the different terminologies in use in the IT and legal fields. In addition, privacy threat modeling 
methodologies are not emphasized in existing threat modeling methodologies, which causes 
ambiguity for privacy threat identification.   
  
3.2. Technical Deployment and Service Models 
 
Cloud computing delivers computing software, platforms and infrastructures as services based on 
pay-as-you-go models. Cloud service models can be deployed for on-demand storage and 
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computing power can be provided in the form of software-as-a-service (SaaS), platform-as-a-
service (PaaS) or infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) [14]. Cloud services can be delivered to 
consumers using different cloud deployment models: private cloud, community cloud, public 
cloud, and hybrid cloud. The five essential characteristics of cloud computing are defined as on-
demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured 
service [14]. 
 
3.3. Customer Needs  
 
The actual needs of the cloud consumers must be taken into consideration throughout the whole 
life cycle of a project. Additionally, during the course of a project, requests for changes often 
arise and these may affect the design of the final system. Consequently it is important to identify 
any privacy threats arising from the customer needs that result from such change requests. 
Customer satisfaction can be achieved through engaging customers from the early stages of threat 
modeling so that the resulting system satisfies the customer’s needs while maintaining adequate 
levels of privacy. 
 
3.4. Usability 
 
Cloud-based tools aim at reducing IT costs and supporting faster release cycles of high quality 
software. Threat modeling mechanisms for cloud environments should therefore be compatible 
with the typical fast pace of software development in clouds-based projects. However producing 
easy-to-use products with an appropriate balance between maintaining the required levels of 
privacy while satisfying the consumer’s demands can be challenging when it comes to cloud 
environments. 
 
3.5. Traceability 
 
Each potential threat that is identified should be documented accurately and be traceable in 
conjunction with the associated privacy requirements. If threats can be traced in this manner, it 
means that threat modeling activities are efficient in tracing of the original privacy requirements 
that are included in the contextual information and changes over the post-requirement steps such 
as design, implementation, verification and validation.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY STEPS AND THEIR PRODUCTS 
 
Motivated by the facts that privacy and security are two distinct topics and that no single 
methodology could fit all possible software development activities, we apply ME that aims to 
construct methodologies to satisfy the demands of specific organizations or projects [17]. In [5], 
ME is defined as “the engineering discipline to design, construct, and adapt methods, techniques 
and tools for the development of information systems”. 
 
There are several approaches to ME [17, 15] such as a fundamentally “ad-hoc” approach where a 
new method is constructed from scratch, “paradigm-based” approaches where an existing meta-
model is instantiated, abstracted or adapted to achieve the target methodology, “Extension-based” 
approaches that aim to enhance an existing methodology with new concepts and features, and 
“assembly-based” approaches where a methodology is constructed by assembling method 
fragments within a repository. 
 
Figure 1 represents different phases in a common SDLC. Initial security requirements are 
collected and managed in the requirements engineering phase (A). This includes identifying the 
quality attributes of the project and assessing the risk associated with achieving them. A design is 
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composed of architectural solution, attack surface analysis and the privacy threat model. Potential 
privacy threats against the software that is being developed are identified and solutions are 
proposed to mitigate for adversarial attacks (B). The proposed solution from the design phase is 
implemented through a technical solution and deployment (C). This includes performing static 
analysis on source code for software comprehension without actually executing programs. The 
verification process (D) includes extensive testing, dynamic analysis on the executing programs 
on virtual resources and fuzzing as a black-box testing approach to discover coding errors and 
security loopholes in the cloud system. Finally, in the Validation phase the end-users participate 
to assess the actual results versus their expectations, and may put forth further change requests if 
needed.  
 
 
Figure 1, Privacy Threat Modeling in Requirements Engineering and Design of a SDLC  
 
Our proposed methodology identifies the privacy requirements in the Requirements Engineering 
step, as shown in Figure 2. The results from the Requirements Engineering, which include 
specifications for privacy regulatory compliance, are fed into the Design step, where activities 
such as specifying the appropriate cloud environment, identifying privacy threats, evaluating risks 
and mitigating threats are conducted. Then the produced privacy threat model would be used in 
the implementation step finally it would be verified and validated in the subsequent steps.  
 
 
 
Figure 2, Overview of the Extended CPTM Methodology Steps 
 
Cloud stakeholders and participants such as cloud users, software engineering team and legal 
experts will engage in the activities shown in Figure 2 to implement the threat model in context of 
steps A and B in Figure 1. Cloud software architect as a member of the software engineering team 
initiates a learning session to clarify the methodology steps and their products, privacy 
requirements (introducing the law title that is needed to be enforced in the cloud environment), 
and quality attributes such as performance, usability. The legal experts will identify the definitive 
requirements that ensure the privacy of data in the platform. In the Design step, the cloud 
software architect presents architecture of the developing cloud environment for various 
participants. This will result in a unified terminology to be used in the privacy threat model.  
The rest of this section outlines the implementation model of the steps represented in Figure 2.  
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4.1. Privacy Regulatory Compliance 
 
Interpreting privacy regulatory frameworks can often be complex for software engineering teams. 
Further, the law is not constant since both legislators and courts may enact and interpret decisions 
that change and affect the law as it stands. For example, the verdict of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in October 2015 to invalidate the Safe Harbor Agreement may have rather 
important repercussions for transferring data between the EU and the USA [24].  In the privacy 
regulatory compliance step, learning sessions with privacy experts, clients (cloud consumers) and 
requirements engineers facilitates the elicitation of privacy requirements (PR). For example, in 
the EU’s DPD some of the privacy requirements are: lawfulness, informed consent, purpose 
binding, transparency, data minimization, data accuracy, data security, and accountability [6]. 
These principles are also included in the General Data Protection Regulation which the EU 
legislator is expected to enact during spring 2016 [26]. Each of the requirements that are 
identified will be labeled with an identifier, e.g., (PRi), name and description to be used in later 
stages. 
 
4.2. Cloud Environment Specification 
 
To ensure that the final cloud software will comply with the relevant legal and regulatory 
framework, several of the key characteristics that are affected by cloud computing services 
(including virtualization, outsourcing, offshoring, and autonomic technologies) must be specified. 
For this purpose, the physical/logical architectures of the deployment and service model can be 
developed according to the following steps. 
 
● Step A: Define the cloud actors [18] (such as Cloud Consumer, Cloud Provider, Cloud 
Auditor, Cloud Broker, and Cloud Carrier). Cloud consumer is a person or organization 
uses service from cloud providers in context of a business relationship. Cloud provider 
makes service available to interested users. Cloud auditor conducts independent 
assessment of cloud services, operations, performance and security of the deployment. 
Cloud broker manages the use, performance and delivery of cloud services and 
establishes relationships between cloud providers and cloud consumers. Cloud carrier 
provides connectivity and transport of cloud services from cloud providers to cloud 
consumers through the network. 
● Step B: Describe a detailed model of the cloud deployment physical architecture where 
the components will be deployed across the cloud infrastructure. This should give details 
of where the components will be deployed and run, for example, the operating system 
version, the database version, the virtual machine location, and where the database server 
will run. 
● Step C: Describe the logical architecture of the cloud services model where the major 
cloud services, along with and the relationships between them that are necessary to fulfill 
the project requirements, are recorded. This should include the data flow and connections 
between the relevant cloud services and actors. Note that in this context, an entity is a 
cloud service with a set of properties that meet a specific functional requirement. 
● Step D: Describe the assets that need to be protected, the boundaries of the cloud and any 
potential attackers that might endanger either the cloud environment or the assets that 
have been identified as being associated with that particular cloud. 
 
The cloud environment specification step consists of composing an architectural report including 
assets that are subject to privacy protection, cloud actors, physical architecture of the deployment 
model, and logical architecture of the service model. 
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4.3. Privacy Threat Identification 
 
In this step, privacy threats against the PRs that were established in section 3.1 will be identified 
and analyzed. To achieve this, the system designers will undertake the following steps.  
 
● Step A: Select a privacy requirement from the PR list for threat analysis, e.g., 
(PR2). 
● Step B: Correlate identified cloud actors (Step A from Section 3.2) with the actor 
roles that are defined in the project’s privacy law. For example, correlating the Data 
Controller role as a Cloud Consumer, or the Data Processor role as a Cloud Provider in 
the DPD. 
Step C: Identify the technical threats that can be launched by an adversary to privacy 
and label them in the specified cloud environment. The cloud environment specification 
in Section 4.2 facilitates the threat identification. In SaaS clouds only application-level 
threats are required to be addressed. While in PaaS clouds threat identification focuses on 
OS and application level, where in IaaS clouds emphasis is physical hardware, network 
and storage. The attack surface for each service model varies with the cloud deployment 
model. For example, privacy threats within a private cloud might be smaller than a public 
cloud that is run by a commercial vendor. Public, hybrid or community clouds pose 
specific privacy threats on data locality which can be considered as an important privacy 
requirement. 
Each identified threat can be named as a Ti,j, where i indicates that threat T that 
corresponds to PRi and j indicates the actual threat number. For example, in T2,5 2 
indicates relevance of the threat to PR2 and 5 is the actual threat number.  
● Step D: Repeat the previous steps until all PRs are processed. 
 
The threat identification step consists of composing an analysis report including a list of threats 
including id, name, date, author, threat scenario for each class of the PRs. 
 
4.4. Risk Evaluation 
 
In this step, project actors participate to rank the threats that have been identified in Section 3.3 
with regard to their estimated level of importance and the expected severity of their effect on the 
overall privacy of the cloud environment. The Importance (I) indicates the likelihood of a 
particular threat occurring and the level of the Effect (E) indicates the likely severity of the 
damage if that threat against the cloud environment were carried out.  
 
This step results in composing a risk evaluation report similar to the case study in Table 3 
(Section 5.5). This report prioritizes the importance and effects of the privacy threats and it will 
be used in the Threat Mitigation step in Section 3.5.  
 
4.5. Threat Mitigation 
 
In this step, the threat modeling team proposes countermeasures to the threats that were identified 
in the previous step as having the highest likelihood of occurrence and the worst potential effects 
on the cloud environment. Each countermeasure should clearly describe a solution that reduces 
the probability of the threat occurring and that also reduces the negative effects on the cloud if the 
threat was carried out. 
 
Finally, the recommended countermeasures from this step should be documented and fed into the 
implementation step to be realized through coding and for their effectiveness to be assessed by 
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static analysis. In the later stages of verification and validation, each such countermeasure will be 
evaluated and approved by the participants. 
 
5. CASE STUDY 
 
Presented here is a description of the implementation of our proposed methodology for a PaaS 
BiobankCloud [21]. This includes a high-level definition of the BiobankCloud and an exemplary 
workflow. We follow the guidelines from Section 4 and demonstrate products of each step in the 
methodology.  
 
5.1. Overview      
 
The BiobankCloud platform is a collaborative project bringing together computer scientists, 
bioinformaticians, pathologists, and biobankers [21]. BiobankCloud aims to provide the 
capability of deploying sequencing applications with their dependencies within an environment 
called a container within a cloud computing environment.  
 
Assume the BiobankCloud participants are Alice (Researcher) as Cloud Consumer representative, 
Bob (BiobankCloud) as Cloud Provider, Dennis as Auditor, Tom as Lawyer and Ove as Cloud 
Software Architect evaluate the corresponding risk of each identified threats. A typical scenario 
to use the BiobankCloud platform by Alice (Researcher) is as following steps. 
 
1. Alice registers an account in the platform and automatically will be considered as a guest 
user. 
2. Bob enables Alice and entitles appropriate access control levels. 
3. Alice opens the login page and enters the authentication credentials. 
4. Bob authenticates the user according the presented credentials. 
5. If the Alice is authenticated, Bob will permit her login to the platform. 
6. Alice uploads genomics data and tries to run a workflow in the platform. 
7. Bob ensures that Alice has enough permission to run the workflow. 
8. Depending on the permission check: 
a) If Alice is not authorized to run the workflow she will be denied by Bob. 
b) If Alice is granted to access the resources demanded by the workflow, she will be 
permitted 
9. Bob authorizes Alice to run the workflow and access the genomic data in the platform 
through the platform execution cluster. This cluster stores the results in the platform and 
presents the results to Alice. 
10. The platform stores the log information from the above steps for auditing purposes by 
Dennis (Auditor). 
 
This usage scenario will be used in the following steps (5.3 and 5.4) for actor-role correlations. 
 
5.2. Privacy Requirements 
 
The BiobankCloud platform demands to enforce the DPD requirements. The DPD is the EU’s 
initial attempt at privacy protection, containing 72 recitals and 34 articles to harmonize the 
regulations for information flow within the EU Member States. The identified privacy 
requirements include the main roles of the DPD and the DPD fundamental PRs are lawfulness, 
informed consent, purpose binding, data minimization, data accuracy, transparency, data security, 
and accountability [6]. 
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The DPD also highlights the demand for cross-border transfer of data through non-legislative 
measures and self-control. One example of where these types of privacy principles are being used 
is the Safe Harbor Agreement (SHA) which made it possible transfer data to US-based cloud 
providers that are assumed to have appropriate data protection mechanisms. However, as seen 
above, the European Court of Justice declared the SHA invalid in a ruling in October 2016 [25].  
 
There is an ongoing effort [23, 28] to replace the EU DPD with a new a General Data Protection. 
Regulation containing more than 130 recitals and 91 articles that aim to lay out a data protection 
framework in Europe [26]. The proposed regulation will have a wider scope of application, 
covering processing of data from third state that is directed to the EU, such as to offer goods and 
services. Also the understanding of what is personal data is expanded in one specific context, 
namely through recital 25a of the proposal of the Regulation where it is stated that genetic data 
should be defined as personal data relating to the genetic characteristics of an individual which 
have been inherited or acquired as they result from an analysis of a biological sample from the 
individual in question, in particular DNA or RNA. This will restrict the processing of genetic 
data, since it could never be considered to fall outside the Regulation. The regulation also 
includes definitions of new roles related to handling data (such as data transfer officers) and 
considerably strengthens the role and functions of national data authorities [28]. For example, the 
regulation confers the power to the authorities to impose significant penalties for privacy 
breaches that result from violations of the regulations, for example, such a penalty could be 0.5 
percent of the worldwide annual turnover of the offending enterprise [27].  
 
The privacy requirements of the DPD including the DPD roles have been discussed in [6] and in 
the following we briefly summarize those identified requirements. 
 
The main roles of the DPD participants are the data subject, controller, and processor. Article 2.a 
of the DPD defines data subject as an identifiable individual associated with the personal data. In 
Article 2.d, controller is defined as the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purpose and means of the processing 
of personal data. The processor acts as the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller, as defined in Article 2.e. 
 
PR1 Lawfulness sets out the basic premises for the legitimate processing of data, that all 
processing must be conducted within the regulatory framework of the DPD.  
 
PR2 Informed Consent justifies processing of genomic data in the BiobankCloud. The genomic 
data may have been provided with informed consent through the data provider which constitutes 
the main justification for processing.  
 
PR3 Purpose Binding ensures that personal data processing is performed according to 
predetermined purposes. The collected genetic data in the BiobankCloud will only be processed 
according to the purposes covered by the informed consent given by the subject or, if the law 
applicable to the Data Provider so admits, according to further purposes within the legal 
framework. 
 
PR4 Data Minimization restricts extra and unnecessary disclosure of information to third parties, 
such as cloud provider, to reduce the risk of information leakage that leads to privacy breaches.  
 
PR5 Data Accuracy describes the necessity to keep data accurate and to be updated by the Data 
Provider. A controller holding personal information shall not use that information without taking 
steps to ensure with reasonable certainty that the data are accurate and up to date.  
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PR6 Transparency entitles the data subjects to have information about the processing of their data 
and thereby a means to learn of the processing operation of their data. Transparency thus 
functions as a prerequisite for the data subjects to monitor that the data is accurate, in accordance 
to PR5.  
 
PR7 Data Security proposes implementing technical measures to provide legitimate access and 
organizational safeguards. The Data Provider shall ensure that whoever processes the data on his 
behalf, e.g., the cloud provider assures adequate levels of security against unlawful data 
processing.  
 
PR8 Accountability mandates internal, external auditing and control for various assurance reasons. 
The Data Provider is responsible to ensure compliant of supplied genomic data usage to the cloud 
providers.  
 
5.3. Cloud Environment Specification 
 
Step A: The BiobankCloud actors are identified through the general use cases. For example, from 
the usage scenario, Researcher, Guest, Data Provider, Administrator, and Auditor actors are 
identified as described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1, Correlating the Domain Actors to the Cloud Actors 
 
Domain Actor Cloud Actor Description 
Researcher, Guest, 
Data Provider 
Cloud Consumer: A person 
or organization that uses 
service from the 
BiobankCloud 
● Researchers who are affiliated with the institutions 
that hold the genomic data. The researcher acts under 
the responsibility of the Data Provider, as described in 
this section. The guest researcher conducts experiments 
on subjects genomic data.  
● The Guest is able to log in to the BiobankCloud and 
browse public content of the platform.  
● Data Provider is the person responsible for the data 
and permitting The Guest can only access the resources 
and data in the BiobankCloud after permission has 
been granted by the Data Provider. 
Administrator Cloud Provider: The 
BiobankCloud platform that 
makes service available to 
interested users. 
The administrator enables the users of the platform and 
installs new libraries. This actor can also assign/revoke 
roles from the users. 
Auditor Cloud Auditor: Conducts 
independent assessment of 
cloud services, operations, 
performance and security of 
the deployment. 
The Auditor is able to see major identity and access 
management events, in addition to user authentication, 
authorization events to ensure compliance with the 
privacy legislation. 
 
Step B: BiobankCloud Physical Architecture 
 
The BiobankCloud is designed as a PaaS to be easily installed on a private cloud using Karamel 
and Chef 2 [21]. The Chef recipes parametrize Vagrant 3 to create the virtualized clusters and 
services over 14.04 images using Hadoop4 Open Platform-as-a-Service (Hops), as shown in 
                                                    
2
 http://www.karamel.io/ 
3
 https://docs.vagrantup.com/v2/virtualbox 
4
 https://hadoop.apache.org/ 
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Figure 3. Hops utilize the Hadoop version 2.x within a Hadoop Cluster (Hops-YARN) and Hops 
infrastructure containing MySQL 7.x cluster and Hops file system (Hops-FS).   
 
 
 
Figure 3: BiobankCloud Physical Architecture 
 
GlassFish server version 4.0.1 over JDK 7.0 is used to run the big data lab information 
management system (LIMS). This server is confined between external and internal firewalls to 
separate it from the trusted private network behind the internal firewall. The platform users are 
able to access the web pages from the browsers in their computers through an external firewall, 
while platform administrator can only access the platform within the trusted network. 
 
Step C: BiobankCloud Logical Architecture 
 
The BiobankCloud LIMS consists of several components for secure access, workflow execution, 
data sharing, as shown in Figure 4. Hops-FS as the next-generation of the Hadoop Filesystem 
(HDFS) supports multiple stateless Name Nodes but it keeps the metadata in a MySQL Cluster. 
Hops-YARN is another component that provides distributed stateless resource management with 
storing states in the MySQL Cluster for fault-tolerant. 
 
The BiobankCloud services will be deployed in a PaaS private cloud. The user requests will be 
dispatched to a multi-tenant Hadoop cluster that is managed by the Hops-YARN. The Hadoop 
cluster runs submitted jobs and will notify the user through the LIMS interfaces. The Node 
Manager is an agent that is responsible for containers, monitoring their resource usage such as 
CPU, memory, network and reporting to the Hops-YARN resource manager.  
 
A DataNode manages storage of each container node using keeping a set of blocks related to 
files. When a workflow is executed, its algorithmic dependencies will be fetched into the 
container as data-staging phase. 
 
 Step D: Assets, Boundaries and Attackers 
 
The BiobankCloud platform stores genomic data which constitute as the main asset.  The 
platform services that are provided to the external users can also be considered as assets. The 
security boundaries consist of firewalls that control the incoming/outgoing traffic through the 
BiobankCloud along with the physical means to deny access to the computing platform for 
unauthorized persons. Eavesdroppers and malicious users are known as attackers or adversaries 
that are able to exploit the possible vulnerabilities in the platform. 
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Figure 4: BiobankCloud Logical Architecture 
 
 5.4. Privacy Threat Identification 
 
Step A: Select a privacy requirement from the PR list for threat analysis from {PR1, PR2,…, 
PR8}. 
Step B: Correlate the domain actors to the DPD roles.  
 
Table 2, Correlating the BiobankCloud actors with the DPD roles 
 
Cloud Domain 
Actor 
DPD Role Role Description 
Cloud Consumer Data Subject or  
Data Controller 
● Data Subject: The individual person from which the 
genomic data has been extracted  
● Data Controller: The entity that owns or provides the 
genomic data to the platform and decides on the 
processing of the data. 
Cloud Provider Data Processor The BiobankCloud platform and all the administrative 
resources that provide the computing services to the 
Cloud Consumers. The Data Processer may only act on 
behalf of the Controller. 
Cloud Auditor Data Processor or 
Data Controller 
Auditor inspects compliance with legal and accountable 
processing and storage of the genomic data according to 
the DPD rules. If the auditor simply processes the data 
on behalf of the controller (e.g, internal control) then 
he/she is a processor. Otherwise, he/she can act as a 
controller on his/her own right.  
 
Step C: Identify the technical threats that can be launched by an adversary to privacy and label 
them in the specified cloud environment. Each identified threat can be named as a Ti,j, where i 
indicates that threat T that corresponds to PRi and j indicates the actual threat number. For 
example, in T2,5 value 2 indicates relevance of the threat to PR2 and value 5 is the actual threat 
number. 
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T1 PR1 (Lawfulness)  
 
• T1,1: Lack of relevant information on legal rights and duties to allow data subject and 
other interested parties to use effective means for accessing the data. 
• T1,2: Amendments of legal requirements or unawareness of new rules. Incorrect 
interpretation or application of legal concepts leading to unlawful processing of 
(complex) data. 
• T1,3: Lack of agreement from all entities regarding the processing the genomic data. 
• T1,4: If data are not obtained in accordance with the law, or without approval (informed 
consent or ethics board). 
 
T2 PR2 (Informed Consent) 
 
• T2,1: Excessive terms of service (ToS) containing too much specific information that are 
not clear enough, e.g., legal terms that are not easily understandable for a layman. 
•  T2,2: Lack of possibility to give consent dynamically to a specific subset of genomic data. 
 
T3 PR3 (Purpose Binding) 
 
• T3,1: Researcher does not use the data according to the initial purpose or the Data 
Provider does not use the data according to the purposes. 
• T3,2: Researcher who has access to multiple data studies, makes cross-link analysis to the 
genomic data that is not consented and, hence illegal, according to the PR1 and PR2. 
 
T4 PR4 (Data Minimization) 
 
• T4,1: The requested sensitive data to be used by cloud provider or guest researcher is not 
certain or well defined in advance.  
• T4,2: If the Data Provider does not define the retention period of the sensitive (genomic) 
data, there is a threat of accumulating more and more sensitive data over time, that can be 
used for inference and linking attacks. 
 
T5 PR5 (Data Accuracy) 
 
• T5,1: If the Data Provider cannot or will not update data when having wrong information 
has been found to be incorrect. 
• T5,2: Data Provider uploads data to the cloud provider but data source validity is not 
affirmed. 
 
T6 PR6 (Transparency) 
 
• T6,1: Lack of communication and information between entities. The threat is even more 
sever when the lack of information or openness is harmful for weaker parties, the sample 
donor/data subject. 
• T6,2: Researchers or Data Provider cannot get access to modify or erase data, due to 
unclear data processing procedures. 
 
T7 PR7 (Data Security) 
 
• T7,1: Theft of authentication credentials by an adversary through phishing attacks or 
network eavesdropping, brute force attacks to guess authentication credentials or 
identities of users. 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA) Vol.8, No.2, March 2016 
116 
• T7,2: Injecting code such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting (XSS) format, type or 
length of input data.  
• T7,3: Wide access to data by a large group of people. 
• T7,4: Elevation of privileges by an attacker to change the access rights to higher 
privileges. 
• T7,5: Unavailability of data due to denial of service (DoS) attacks. 
• T7,6: Session reply through message theft by eavesdropping to steal a session. 
• T7,7: Inference attacks through guessing or background knowledge to the minimized data, 
required by PR4. 
• T7,8: Storing passwords, credentials, database connections, keys in plain text or within the 
source code. 
• T7,9: Existing bugs in the OS kernel that can be target for an attacker to exploit them. 
 
T8 PR8 (Accountability) 
 
• T8,1: Lack of mechanism for secure auditing to provide evidence of confidentiality and 
integrity. 
• T8,2: Logging information or audit trails contain sensitive information about the subjects. 
• T8,3: Excessive information in the audit logs to make audit and inspection about usage of 
the genomic data by an auditor. 
 
5.5. Risk Evaluation 
 
The BiobankCloud participants such as analyst, architects and lawyers participate and evaluate 
the important of the threats as summarized in the Table 3.  
 
Table 3, Risk evaluation matrix for the identified threats. I indicates the likelihood of threat and E 
indicates the effect of exploiting the threat on the whole BiobankCloud. 
 
ID Name Exploit Scenario I E Participants 
T1,1 Lack of 
Lawfulness 
An adversary uses the BiobankCloud to process 
or store genomics information due to lack of 
lawfulness information. 
L H Bob, Dennis, Tom 
T1,2 Amendments of 
Regulations 
An adversary uses the BiobankCloud to avoid 
compliance with new regulations that may have 
strict privacy requirements. 
L M Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove 
T1,3 Lack of 
Agreement 
An adversary is able to process and achieve 
results in the platform without agreeing to the 
BiobankCloud ToS. 
M H Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove, Dennis 
T1,4 Illegally Collected 
Data  
An adversary unlawfully process data without 
ethical and legal permissions. 
M M Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove, Dennis 
T2,1 Excessive ToS The BiobankCloud ToS contains many 
complicated legal terms that clients are not able to 
understand. 
H H Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove 
T2,2 Dynamic 
Consents 
The BiobankCloud platform restricts user to 
update the consent and ethical information. 
H M Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove 
T3,1 Misuse of Data  Researcher does not use the data according to the 
initial purpose or the DP does not use the data 
L H Alice, Bob, Ove, 
Dennis 
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according to the purposes. Also the Biobankcloud 
should not share the genomics data or users data 
to other external entities. 
T3,2 Cross-linking over 
Datasets 
Researcher who has access to multiple data 
studies, makes cross-link analysis to the genomic 
data that is not consented. 
M H Alice, Bob, Ove, 
Dennis 
T4,1 Excessive 
Information 
A Researcher uploads unnecessary information of 
data subjects that is not required by the platform. 
M L Alice, Bob, Ove 
T4,2 Data 
Minimization 
The BiobankCloud platform accumulates huge 
amount of information over time from users who 
have not set data retention period. 
M M Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove, Dennis 
T5,1 Data Modification The BiobankCloud is not able to update the user 
information or genomics data when Data Provider 
or Cloud Consumer decides to update the 
information. 
M M Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove, Dennis 
T5,2 Data Source 
Validity 
An adversary uploads compromised genomics 
data without valid data source references. 
L L Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Dennis 
T6,1 Unclear 
Processing of 
Data 
The BiobankCloud restricts other participants to 
access the information about the data usage in the 
platform and how genomic data is processed.  
H M Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove 
T6,2 Transparent Data 
Access 
Researchers or Data Provider cannot get access to 
modify or erase data, due to unclear data 
processing procedures. 
L M Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove, Dennis 
T7,1 Weak 
Authentication 
An adversary is able to steal user credentials 
through network eavesdropping or password theft 
and make reply attacks. 
H H Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove, Dennis 
T7,2 Input Validation  An adversary is able to issue SQL injection or 
XSS over web pages. 
H H Alice, Bob, Ove 
T7,3 Misusing the 
Roles 
Wide access to data by a large group of people. M H Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove, Dennis 
T7,4 Unauthorized 
Access 
An adversary is able to change his/her privileges 
in order to get permissions from other roles that 
he is not entitled.   
M H Alice, Bob, Ove  
T7,5 Unavailable 
Services 
The BiobankCloud platform is not accessible due 
to technical or adversarial attacks. 
M M Alice, Bob, Ove  
T7,6 Session theft An adversary is able to steal other users sessions 
to compromise integrity of data. 
M M Alice, Bob, Ove  
T7,7 Re-identification 
of Individuals 
An adversary is able to re-identify individuals 
from the data sets with prior background 
knowledge.  
M H Alice, Bob, Ove  
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA) Vol.8, No.2, March 2016 
118 
T7,8 Theft of 
Credentials in 
Source Code 
An adversary is able to steal the platform master 
keys and credentials that are written in the source 
code or unsecure text storage. 
M H Alice, Bob, Ove  
T7,9 Kernel Exploits An attacker is able to exploit OS kernel bugs to 
gain access over the host VM or other guest VMs. 
H H Alice, Bob, Ove 
T8,1 Unsecure auditing Auditor is not able to infer proof of CIA from the 
audit trails 
M M Alice, Bob, Tom, 
Ove, Dennis 
T8,2 Sensitive Info in 
Logs 
An adversary is able to extract sensitive 
information such as data subjects personally 
identifiable information or credentials from the 
platform.  
L M Bob, Tom, Ove, 
Dennis 
T8,3 Unusable Log 
Files 
Auditor is not able to extract information from 
usable audit reports. For example too much 
information or inconsistent log files due to time 
synchronization in the distributed systems. 
H M Bob, Tom, Ove, 
Dennis 
   
5.6. Threat Mitigation 
 
The cloud participants propose trade-off mitigation solutions as countermeasure for the evaluated threats 
from the previous step (Section 5.5) to meet the architectural goals such as privacy vs. usability. Each 
proposed countermeasure refers to the corresponding threat in Section 5.5, i.e. C4,1 indicates 
countermeasure for the threat 
 
T4,1.  
 
C1,1: Establish procedures with legal basis according to {PR1, PR2,…, PR8} to clarify the 
legitimate rights and responsibilities for each role.    
 
C1,2: Apply the possible changes from the new laws or regulations that might affect processing of 
the genomic data within the DPD framework.   
 
C1,3: Upon registration of new users provide a definitions of the platform ToS and user 
responsibilities. 
 
C1,4: Assume uploaded data could have been collected illegally by a Cloud Consumer and for this 
purpose ethical approval and consent forms of data subject must be presented and validated by 
Administrator role.   
 
C2.1: The BiobankCloud ToS should not contain complicated legal terms or conditions that are 
difficult for a non-law expert to interpret. It only requires to clearly describe the responsibilities 
short and precisely.  
 
C2,2: The consents and ethical information can be updated by the Cloud Consumer whenever there 
are new forms. The platform stores older versions for auditing purposes. 
 
C3,1: For every new data set there should be new consents and ethical approval forms. For 
example, if there is a running approved project and a set of new data is uploaded, the 
Administrator should be provided with further evidence of ethical permits over the study. 
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C3,2: Restrict users with the aim to run cross-linking analytical jobs over multiple independent 
data sets that is not consented by the data subjects. Also data sets or Cloud Consumer information 
must be kept confidential to the BiobankCloud. 
 
C4,1: The platform should not be implemented in a way to require excessive information from the 
Researchers or data subjects.  
 
C4,2: Users will update the data retention period and when this date expires the Administrator 
manually delete the data after notifying the user.  
 
C5,1: Allow all users to be able to update their information on-demand in addition to update or 
erasure of genomics data. 
 
C5,2: Administrator should be able to approve or reject projects based on their validity. For 
example, if an uploaded data is incompatible with the platform or data has been acquired from 
unknown sources, the Administrator can reject processing that project. 
 
C6,1: The platform data usage should be transparent for authorized parties such as Administrators 
and Auditors to see all the activities. Data Provider to see the data access attempts on the 
uploaded data sets. 
 
C6,2: Provide functionalities to update the information such as genomics data or ethical approval 
consent forms that are required to be modified by the authorized roles. Updated information 
should be transparent to the user who made the changes. 
 
C7,1: Implement usable strong authentication mechanisms such as two-factor authentication, 
biometrics authentication or public key certificates to avoid compromising security of the 
platform through stealing user credentials. 
 
C7,2: Validate the input at least in the LIMS server to restrict any possible SQL injection, XSS or 
cookie/query string/HTTP manipulation. 
 
C7,3: The platform should classifies the responsibilities and permissions of each role to avoid 
granting a broad range of responsibilities to each user. For example restrict Auditor to have 
Administrator permissions. 
 
C7,4: For every attempt to access the resources ensure the identity of user and enforce the 
predefined polices for that user. For example in the LIMS platform ensure RBAC while in the 
Hops enforce discretionary access control in a fine-grained approach. 
 
C7,5: Protect the internal services through the internal firewall that restricts the I/O HTTPS traffic 
to another external firewall where is only accessible through a secure port. Using intrusion 
detection techniques identify the intruders and block their IP address. 
 
C7,6: Do not trust the safety of user computers and keep the session state information in the server 
side and do not send more than an opaque session identifier to the users. Encrypt whatever that is 
sent to the client with the server keys for making it confidential in the client machine over secure 
HTTPS channels. Also for every new session create new session information both in the server 
and for client. 
 
C7,7: Anonymize the micro data that contains explicit identifier of data subjects. For example, 
apply k-anonymity or l-diversity to generalize the sensitive attributes. 
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C7,8: Avoid using the secret credentials such as connection names, passwords in the source code 
or storing them in plain text in the platform.  
 
C7,9: Run the Hops and other services in virtualized secure environments where integrity of 
images are ensured prior to installation. Apply latest patches to ensure safety of the VMs and 
ensure all communications between user and LIMS server are encrypted. 
  
C8,1: The platform should store log files related to study data, consents management, 
authentication, authorization,  identity and access management for all users actions. Store the log 
files in the high availability Hops services. Do not modify or delete the log files.  
 
C8,2: Prevent the application, server, data bases components or the logger of the LIMS server to 
include sensitive credentials and information. For example default setting of Glassfish can be 
turned off to avoid printing the contents of issued queries. 
 
C8,3: Implement  custom audit modules for consistent logging of important feature such as 
browser, OS, IP/MAC addresses, timestamp, initiator of events, targets and outcome of the 
actions. This will ensure excessive information from the log files will not be displayed in the 
audit report. Additionally, the log server should be synchronized with the rest of process in the 
BiobankCloud to ensure time consistency in the audit reports. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper we identified the requisite steps to build a privacy threat modeling methodology for 
cloud computing environments using an Extension-based Method Engineering approach. For this 
purpose, we extended the Cloud Privacy Threat Modeling (CPTM) methodology to incorporate 
compliance with various legal and regulatory frameworks, in addition to improving the threat 
identification process.  
 
As a proof of concept, the proposed methodology was applied to a BiobankCloud that aims to 
process and store genomic data in a PaaS cloud environment. This BiobankCloud demands 
compliance with the DPD privacy requirements. We formulated the DPD privacy requirements 
and proposed a threat model by engaging the participants to provide a trade-off solution to meet 
the project architectural goals such as privacy vs. usability. 
 
In future research, we aim to build a prototype using this methodology in context of the SDLC 
“implementation” step. Also, we would like to apply our methodology to other privacy 
regulations such as HIPAA to discover strengths and limitations of this approach. 
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